2 · Security headers & packages

TL;DR

Objective — make the app refuse plain HTTP and answer with a full security-header set: HSTS + the standard headers in .htaccess, the same headers re-asserted in a SecurityHeaders middleware, forced HTTPS in production, encrypted high-risk PII, and strong-password defaults — enough for Grade A at securityheaders.com with the pragmatic CSP below ('unsafe-inline' caps securityheaders.com at Grade A until you move to nonces/hashes).

User part + done-when

👤 User part — run the external graders in a browser: confirm Grade A at securityheaders.com and SSL Labs (TLS) A/A+ at SSL Labs and record the date. The code edits and curl checks are terminal-runnable.

Done when all six headers return via curl, HTTP 301-redirects to HTTPS, the SecurityHeaders middleware is registered, production forces HTTPS, and securityheaders.com reads Grade A (SSL Labs (TLS) A/A+ recorded).  ·  ⏱ ~1 hr  ·  🔀 mostly 🤖 agent, with a 👤 grade check.

Background

Headers are set in two layers that reinforce each other: the web server (.htaccess) handles HSTS and the HTTP→HTTPS redirect, and a Laravel middleware sets the application headers so they apply even when a route bypasses the rewrite. Verify SSL is live on every subdomain before you start — HSTS on a subdomain without a valid certificate locks users out.

flowchart LR
  Req["Browser request"] --> CF["Cloudflare<br/>(TLS · edge)"]
  CF --> HT[".htaccess<br/>HSTS + HTTP→HTTPS 301"]
  HT --> MW["SecurityHeaders middleware<br/>X-Frame · X-Content-Type · Referrer · Permissions · CSP"]
  MW --> App["Laravel app<br/>URL::forceScheme('https')"]
  App --> Resp["Response — all 6 headers, Grade A"]

Steps

1. Add HSTS + the header set to .htaccess

Append to the end of public/.htaccess. HSTS and the redirect live here; the application headers are duplicated in the middleware (step 3) so they survive any route that skips the rewrite.

1. Append the HSTS block, the HTTP→HTTPS redirect, and the standard header set.

   # HSTS + HTTPS enforcement
   <IfModule mod_headers.c>
       Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload"
   </IfModule>
   
   <IfModule mod_rewrite.c>
       RewriteEngine On
       RewriteCond %{HTTPS} off
       RewriteRule ^(.*)$ https://%{HTTP_HOST}%{REQUEST_URI} [L,R=301]
   </IfModule>
   
   # Standard security headers — the canonical 6-header set (this page is the
   # authority; Phases 10/11/12 verify THIS exact set, Grade A baseline).
   <IfModule mod_headers.c>
       Header always set X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
       Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
       Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
       Header always set Permissions-Policy "camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=()"
       # Real CSP, not just upgrade-insecure-requests. Vendor admin panels lean on
       # inline script/style, so 'unsafe-inline' is the pragmatic start; tighten
       # script-src to nonces/hashes once you've audited the vendor's inline JS.
       Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests"
       Header unset X-Powered-By
   </IfModule>

   • ✅ public/.htaccess ends with the HSTS, redirect, and header blocks.

Behind Cloudflare, redirect on the forwarded header

Use RewriteCond %{HTTP:X-Forwarded-Proto} !https instead of %{HTTPS} off. Behind a proxy %{HTTPS} is always off at the origin, so the naive rule creates an infinite redirect loop.

A second header default trips people up the same way:

Why SAMEORIGIN, not DENY

X-Frame-Options: DENY blocks all iframes — including payment-gateway callbacks (Stripe, PayPal) and embedded previews. SAMEORIGIN keeps clickjacking protection without breaking those flows.

2. Verify HTTPS + headers

Confirm the redirect fires and every header is present, then run the external graders.

Who does this

🔀 User + Agent — the agent runs the curl checks; 👤 User opens ssllabs.com + securityheaders.com in a browser to read the grade (the agent can’t drive those test sites).

1. Check the headers and redirect with curl.

   curl -sI https://<YOUR_DOMAIN> | grep -iE "(strict|x-frame|x-content|referrer|permissions|content-security)"
   # Expected: all six headers present
   
   curl -I http://<YOUR_DOMAIN>
   # Expected: 301 redirect to https://

   • ✅ All six headers print and HTTP returns a 301 to HTTPS.

2. Confirm Grade A at securityheaders.com (👤) and SSL Labs (TLS) A/A+ where applicable. The pragmatic CSP above includes 'unsafe-inline' for vendor admin panels — that caps securityheaders.com at Grade A, not A+, until you tighten script-src to nonces/hashes. Record grades + date in your security notes.

   • ✅ securityheaders.com reads Grade A (A+ on that grader only after CSP nonce/hash hardening — not from 'unsafe-inline' alone); SSL Labs (TLS) A or A+ recorded with date.

HSTS progression timeline

Ramp max-age as you gain confidence — a short window first, then preload once you’re sure every subdomain is HTTPS-only and will stay that way.

Window	max-age	Note
Month 0–6	31536000 (1 yr)	Initial rollout
Month 6–12	63072000 (2 yr)	Confident config
Month 12+	63072000 + submit to hstspreload.org	Effectively permanent

3. Audit, then add only the security packages you’re missing

On Laravel 10 middleware registers in app/Http/Kernel.php; the vendor package may already ship a security middleware, an auth-token package (Sanctum/Passport), or a permission package. Audit before you install anything — a second permission or token package conflicts with the one already there.

1. Audit what the vendor already ships.

   composer show | grep -E "(sanctum|permission|laratrust|bouncer|cors)"
   ls -la app/Http/Middleware/ | grep -i security
   # Expected: a list of any existing security / permission / token packages

   • ✅ You know which security packages and middleware already exist.

2. Install only the packages the audit shows are absent. Most CodeCanyon apps already bundle Sanctum/Passport and a permission package, so this block is usually a no-op.

   # Only if NO permission package exists (Spatie Permission, Laratrust, Bouncer):
   composer require spatie/laravel-permission
   php artisan vendor:publish --provider="Spatie\Permission\PermissionServiceProvider"
   
   # Only if Sanctum is not installed and you need API tokens:
   composer require laravel/sanctum
   php artisan vendor:publish --provider="Laravel\Sanctum\SanctumServiceProvider"
   
   php artisan migrate
   # Expected: only the genuinely-missing packages install; migrations run clean

   • ✅ No duplicate permission/token package was added.

3. Create a SecurityHeaders middleware if none exists.

   php artisan make:middleware SecurityHeaders
   # Expected: app/Http/Middleware/SecurityHeaders.php created

   <?php
   namespace App\Http\Middleware;
   
   use Closure;
   use Illuminate\Http\Request;
   
   class SecurityHeaders
   {
       public function handle(Request $request, Closure $next)
       {
           $response = $next($request);
   
           $response->header('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
           $response->header('X-Frame-Options', 'SAMEORIGIN');
           $response->header('Referrer-Policy', 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin');
           $response->header('Permissions-Policy', 'geolocation=(), camera=(), microphone=()');
           $response->header('Content-Security-Policy', "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: https:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; upgrade-insecure-requests");
   
           // HSTS is handled by .htaccess (step 1) + Cloudflare — do NOT set it here.
           // Set headers in ONE layer: if .htaccess already emits these, don't
           // double-set here — pick the layer your host actually runs (.htaccess
           // on Apache, this middleware where mod_headers is unavailable).
           return $response;
       }
   }

   • ✅ The middleware class exists and re-asserts the four application headers.

4. Register it in the global middleware stack.

   Laravel 10 vs 11

   Laravel 10 and below: add \App\Http\Middleware\SecurityHeaders::class to the $middleware array in app/Http/Kernel.php. Laravel 11+: register the same class in bootstrap/app.php via ->withMiddleware(function ($middleware) { $middleware->append(\App\Http\Middleware\SecurityHeaders::class); }) — there is no app/Http/Kernel.php on a fresh L11 skeleton.

   // Laravel 10 — app/Http/Kernel.php
   protected $middleware = [
       // ... existing middleware
       \App\Http\Middleware\SecurityHeaders::class,
   ];

   • ✅ SecurityHeaders::class is registered in the global middleware stack for your Laravel version.

Skip what already exists

If the vendor already installed a permission package (Spatie Permission, Laratrust, Bouncer) or Sanctum/Passport, do not install a second — they conflict. Record what’s present and move on.

4. Force HTTPS in production

Make the app generate https:// URLs in production so no link or asset downgrades the connection.

1. Force the scheme in AppServiceProvider::boot().

   use Illuminate\Support\Facades\URL;
   
   public function boot(): void
   {
       if ($this->app->isProduction()) {
           URL::forceScheme('https');
       }
   }

   • ✅ Production URL generation forces https.

5. Encrypt high-risk PII fields (optional)

Only if the User model carries high-risk PII (tax ID, bank account, SSN), cast those fields to Encrypted.

1. Cast the high-risk columns with the built-in encrypted cast.

   // app/Models/User.php — no import needed; 'encrypted' is a built-in cast string
   protected $casts = [
       'phone'  => 'encrypted',
       'tax_id' => 'encrypted',
   ];

   Use the cast string, not a class

   There is no public Illuminate\Database\Eloquent\Casts\Encrypted class — referencing Encrypted::class fatals with class not found. The encrypted cast is the string 'encrypted' (and 'encrypted:array' / 'encrypted:json' for structured columns).

   • ✅ High-risk PII fields use the 'encrypted' cast (or this step is skipped as not applicable).

Encryption is keyed to APP_KEY

Existing rows are not auto-encrypted — only data written after this change. And never rotate APP_KEY (see Harden first) without migrating encrypted data first, or the ciphertext becomes undecryptable.

6. Require strong passwords

Centralize the rule in AppServiceProvider::boot() — strict in production, relaxed locally.

1. Set password defaults and reference them in validation.

   use Illuminate\Validation\Rules\Password;
   
   Password::defaults(fn () => $this->app->isProduction()
       ? Password::min(12)->letters()->mixedCase()->numbers()->symbols()->uncompromised()
       : Password::min(8));

   • ✅ Password::defaults() enforces a strict production rule and a relaxed local one.

Then reference Password::defaults() in validation: 'password' => ['required', 'confirmed', Password::defaults()]. For vendor apps, check whether registration validation already lives in a vendor file before editing.

7. Lock certificate issuance with CAA (deferred from Phase 4)

Phase 4 (DNS email records) deliberately deferred CAA until the certificate strategy was final. It is now: Cloudflare/CDN and SSL are locked, so add the CAA DNS records here. CAA restricts which certificate authorities may issue for your domain — a cheap defence against cert mis-issuance, but only safe once the issuing CA won’t change.

1. Add CAA records at your DNS provider for the issuer(s) actually in use (check Cloudflare → SSL/TLS → Edge Certificates, or your CA’s documented value, before adding).

   example.com.  CAA  0 issue "letsencrypt.org"
   example.com.  CAA  0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"
   example.com.  CAA  0 iodef "mailto:security@example.com"

   • ✅ dig CAA example.com +short returns your real issuer, and a test cert renewal still succeeds.

Match the records to your real issuer

A CAA record naming the wrong CA silently blocks renewal — the cert fails ~75 days later, long after the change that caused it. Confirm the CA Cloudflare/your host actually uses before adding CAA, and re-check after any CDN or CA change. (Cloudflare switched issuers in 2024; a stale letsencrypt.org-only CAA would have broken renewal.)

Checklist

Do not mark this step done until every box below is checked.

• 🤖 HSTS + redirect in .htaccess — forwarded-proto rule if behind Cloudflare.
• 🔀 Headers verified — all six present via curl; Grade A at securityheaders.com; SSL Labs (TLS) A or A+ (👤 browser check).
• 🤖 SecurityHeaders middleware — created + registered (or existing one confirmed).
• 🤖 Production HTTPS + passwords — URL::forceScheme('https') in production; strong-password defaults set.
• 🤖 PII encrypted (if applicable) — high-risk fields use the 'encrypted' cast; APP_KEY rotation caveat noted.
• 🔀 CAA records (deferred from Phase 4) — issuance locked to the real CA(s); dig CAA confirms; renewal still succeeds — or explicitly skipped + logged.

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